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Abstract
Cases reported in information systems (IS) research indicate an abundance of implementation projects
that get delayed, run over budget, are not used as intended, or are stopped. Focusing on integrated
information systems in the healthcare sector, we analyse the process of how complexities escalate
stepwise during implementation. This escalation appears to take place despite sound planning,
competent project leaders, committed management and involved users. Rather than the result of
mistakes or misconceptions, the escalating complexity is the result of the type and extent of
interdependencies between the different modules constituting the integrated systems. The paper also
focuses on the actual outcome of the integration effort. In line with the debunking of overly
dichotomous classifications of implementation projects into “success” and “failure”, we contribute by
characterizing degrees of integration in integrated information systems. A key point is that integrated
Information Systems work, but unevenly in terms of functionality and level of necessary workarounds.
Empirically, this paper draws on a longitudinal case study of the implementation of an integrated
laboratory service at the University hospital of Northern Norway. Our case narrative reconstructs the
processes of implementation; emphasising how “small” and often unforeseen issues transformed into
larger issues i.e. an escalation of the project’s complexity. We also point to how the integration in the
laboratory portfolio was maintained with various degrees of workaround.
Keywords: Integration, Laboratory work, Escalation, Complexity, Healthcare, Workaround

1

INTRODUCTION

Cases reported in information systems (IS) research indicate an abundance of implementation projects
that get delayed, run over budget, are not used as intended, or are stopped (Heeks, 2006; Hanseth and
Ciborra, 2007). The problem seems to be even bigger and complex when focusing on integrated
systems in healthcare as many studies on integration projects report on results lagging far behind
expectations (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2008; Auditor General, 2008; Cross, 2006). This
makes it relevant to examine more closely the process of integrating different information systems,
and particularly how complexities escalate stepwise during implementation. The paper argues that the
escalation takes place despite sound planning, competent project leaders, committed management and
involved users. Rather than the result of mistakes or misconceptions, the escalating complexity seems
to be the result of the type and extent of interdependencies between the different modules constituting
the integrated systems.
Still, we are critical about the tendency of debunking of overly dichotomous classifications of
integration efforts into “success” and “failure”. Usefulness of integration may depend on the actual
context, who is involved, what is integrated and the frequency of use. Therefore we also contribute by
characterizing degrees of integration in integrated information systems. Our point is that integrated IS
work, but unevenly in terms of what is needed, implemented functionality and level of necessary
workarounds.
Empirically, this paper draws on a longitudinal case study of the implementation of an integrated
laboratory service at the University hospital of Northern Norway (UNN). The largely independently
and to some degree manually based laboratories were to be more closely integrated with the
“customers” of the services i.e. ordering physicians at the hospital together with general practitioners
in the region. Embedded in the integration effort at UNN, there was also an ambition of standardising
the pre-processing of the laboratory work across the different laboratories to enjoy efficiency gains
through economy of scale. Our case narrative reconstructs the processes of implementation,
emphasising how “small” and often unforeseen issues transformed into larger issues i.e. an escalation
of the project’s complexity. We also point to how the integration in the laboratory portfolio was
maintained with various degrees of workaround.

2

CONCEPTUALISING INTEGRATED SYSTEMS

A Western health care infrastructure is distributed across several institutional boundaries that typically
involve general practitioners, hospitals, nursing homes, and home care services. At the same time there
is increased pressure on the different institutions for more collaboration and integration. For instance,
in the UK’s National Health Service it is argued that:
“Current healthcare policy initiatives in the UK make significant claims about the desirability of
integrated services for better healthcare, i.e. more patient-centred healthcare delivery, improved
resource utilization and better management of information” (Martin et al., 2007, p. 47)
No wonder then that the integration of healthcare software systems has remained one of the most
prominent issues in healthcare software development (Mykkänen et al., 2003) to facilitate smooth
information and workflow between the different institutions and practices. Boochever (2004, p. 16) for
instance, underscores that: “system integration would provide the platform for improved workflow,
patient throughput and patient safety, as well as decreased cost”. Integration is also expected to
automate medical processes, such as ordering of laboratory examinations and receipt of results
(Tsiknakis et al., 2002, p. 11).
There have been many different strategies and approaches to integration. The integration mechanisms
include technical solutions such as federated database systems, World Wide Web, Enterprise Resource
Planning systems (Grimson et al., 2000), components and Internet portals. Common models,
components and architectures are also suggested (Bernstein et al., 2005). There is also a lot of
“promise” connected to a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as a way of dealing with fragmented

systems in the healthcare sector. SOA is beneficial in order to integrate heterogeneity and systems
spread on various locations as it can ‘bridge clinical and related administrative entities with improved
flexibility regardless of platform and physical location’ (Vasilescu and Mun, 2006:94).
The many integration mechanisms in play, does not only point to the many expectations to integration,
it also reflect the enormous challenges and difficulties that integration entails. Despite many
initiatives, only minor steps towards the improvement of electronic inter-organizational collaboration
have been achieved (Auditor General 2008; Cross, 2006). Ham et al. (2011, p. 741) even claims that:
‘integrated electronic medical record remains an aspiration rather than a reality’, hence echoing Berg
(1998, p. 294) who points out that fully integrated systems in healthcare is hard to find.
One reason for the challenges is that many software products have been built and acquired from
heterogeneous sources over long periods, and the systems have differences in technologies and
architectures (Mykkänen et al., 2003, p. 173). Another reason is that many integration projects focus
too narrowly on technical issues. This is also reflected in the medical informatics literature, which is
dominated by a technical perspective on integration.
In comparison, there are numerous contributions to the socio-technical nature of IS implementation in
general, but distressingly few devoted specifically to integrated information systems (but see, for
instance: Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2006; Boudreau and Robey, 2005). There is a similar scarcity of
socio-technically informed studies of the escalation of complexity as part of integration processes
(Hanseth et al., 2004). Hanseth and Ciborra (2007) contain illuminating cases of escalating
complexities of information systems projects, largely due to spreading of side-effects (including those
induced by integration). In a sense, integration projects are about creating interdependencies between
different systems. Data exchange formats have to be agreed on and work processes shaped, etc.
However, the danger is that several overlapping systems and practices may be too tightly coupled. In
this regard, Perrow (1984) uses the notion of loose and tight coupling to describe the degree
of dependencies between the various components. He warns that tightly coupled systems have very
little slack with only limited ways to accomplish a task. A consequence is that there might by difficult
to identify a specific cause for how and why an escalation occurs (Drummond, 1996).
Some studies have also pointed out how work routines are influenced by integration (Volkoff et al.,
2007; Boudreau and Robey, 2005). However, only a few have focused on how work routines and
(technical) integrations is closely intertwined in a sense that “working” solutions may depend on
various degree of “taken-for-granted” workarounds. For instance, a relatively bad technical integration
may work perfectly fine in combination with extensive workarounds as long as the frequency of use is
relatively low. In comparison, if the frequency of use is high, it suggests that the amount of
workaround should be correspondingly low to ensure a working solution. This inherent relationship
between technical integration and workarounds take us beyond the position where integration is
considered as either success or failure – it depends on the context and the frequency of use. This also
echoes Berg and Goorman’s (1999) point, when they argued that the further information has/needs to
be able to circulate (i.e. the more diverse contexts it has/needs to be usable in), the more work is
required/the more work it takes to disentangle the information from the context of its production.

3

METHOD

The case study was conducted at the University Hospital of North Norway (UNN) from January 2006
to November 2010. UNN is the largest hospital in North Norway with approximately 5000 employees.
UNN has seven laboratories: Medical Biochemistry, Clinical Pharmacology, Immunology, the Blood
Bank (a subdivision of the Immunology Laboratory), Microbiology, Pathology, and Medical Genetics.
The laboratories receive requisitions from general practitioners (GPs), other hospitals, and the inhouse clinical wards. The Medical Biochemistry, Clinical Pharmacology and the Immunology are the
largest of the laboratories (measured by the number of analyses), conducting nearly 3 million analyses
a year. In Norway, there is generally a medical biochemistry laboratory linked to each of the country’s
85 hospitals. The Microbiology Laboratory at UNN is one of 20 microbiology laboratories in Norway
and conducts about 400,000 analyses a year.

The study takes an interpretive research approach (Klein and Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995). Data
gathering by the first author consisted of participant observations (work settings and project meetings),
interviews, document analysis, and informal discussions. 48 interviews were conducted, 37 of which
were performed by the first author alone. Most interviews lasted approximately 30 – 60 minutes, but
some lasted up to 1.5 hours. They were taped and subsequently transcribed. Handwritten field notes
were written up as soon as possible after each observation session.

4

“GROUND ZERO” – A MANUAL AND FRAGMENTED PRACTICE

Both among GPs in the northern health region of Norway and among the management at UNN, there
were increasing concerns about lack of efficiency and adequate quality in the communication between
GPs and the laboratories. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, in the health region, most of the
GPs ordered laboratory tests manually using various paper forms. For the GPs, the requisition routines
implied a great deal of paper-based work as well as a lack of documentation of what had been ordered.
Secondly, the hospital saw the lack of a common contact point as a problem. The seven laboratories at
UNN had no common unit to handle the requisitions. Each laboratory took care of its own pre-analytic
work, which involved unpacking, sorting and separating the incoming sample tubes and requisitions as
well as registration of the requisitions in each laboratory’s IT system. Consequently, identical patient
information (patient identification, clinical information, etc.) had to be entered several times whenever
a requisition addressed more than one laboratory. The strict division between the laboratory systems
was also seen as part of the problem, since there was no common pre-analytic system or portal for the
GPs to inquire about status and results. In addition, the fragmentation of the laboratories and their
systems presumably affected the quality of the requests. Sometimes a part of the requisitions went
missing, and was difficult to trace.
Thirdly, a major bottleneck was the substantial resources needed to perform preparation work on the
requisitions received in the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory. An important part of this was to
distribute 80-90% of the received sample tubes from the GP, meaning that the contents of the
(primary) sample tubes were transferred into one or several new (secondary) tubes. There were several
reasons for this: If the number of requested analyses was higher than the number of tubes received
from the GPs, this involved several analysis machines in the laboratories. In addition, sometimes the
tubes did not fit into the relevant analysis machine because they were not of the correct size or
material. Combined with the distribution process was re-labelling. Re-labelling implied that the
assistants printed out and glued a barcode label on every sample tube ready for analysis. This was
necessary because the barcode provided the analysis machines links to instructions for how to analyse
the samples. As the process of distributing and re-labelling involved 500 samples a day, this was an
extremely cumbersome and repetitive process.
Consequently, there were very good reasons for establishing a new integrated solution between the
GPs and the hospital laboratories. It was however obvious that the integration challenge would be
considerable, as the four major laboratories used four different laboratory systems. The Medical
Biochemistry Laboratory used DIPS Lab, which handled more than 80% of the laboratory production
at UNN. DIPS Lab was closely integrated with the hospital’s Electronic Patient Record (EPR), which
also were developed by the vendor DIPS ASA. DIPS ASA controlled approximately 85% of the EPR
market in Norway. The Microbiology Laboratory used SAFIR LIS Deltrix (SAFIR), implemented in
2007, which was developed by ProfDoc. The Pathology Laboratory at UNN had the system Sympathy,
supplied by TietoEnator, which had been in daily use at UNN since 1997. Finally, the Blood Bank
used the system LabCraft from the vendor LabCraft AS.

5

THE VISION – A UNIFORM FRONT-END

To face the challenges outlined, the hospital launched a concerted initiative to deal with the situation.
Firstly, at the turn of the year 2005/2006, the GiLab project was established, involving laboratory
personnel from UNN, the vendor Well Diagnostics AS, and four different GP practices in the Tromsø

area. The primary aim of the project was to develop a system (named Well Interactor) that could
support a seamless electronic information flow between the primary care providers and the hospital’s
laboratory systems. Through integrating Well Interactor with the GPs’ EPR, the GPs were supposed to
be able to order laboratory services directly from their EPR.
Secondly, in September 2006 the hospital established the pre-unit, with a staff consisting of at the
most 37 persons. The pre-unit was to assume the responsibility for all pre-analytic work from the
laboratories. This included unpacking of the samples, registration of requisitions, quality assurance
and preparation of the sample tubes before they were distributed to the various laboratories. All
incoming requisitions and outgoing results would be routed through the unit – a “one-way-in and oneway-out solution”, as the leader of the pre-unit expressed it. With these measures, the hospital
management expected a staff reduction of 10.5 full-time equivalents for the laboratories.
Thirdly, the project group planned to establish a Pre-analytic Management System (PMS) to take care
of all the incoming electronic requisitions. The idea was that after they were received in the PMS,
laboratory test requests should be routed to DIPS Lab, SAFIR and Sympathy respectively. The use of
the PMS would ensure that requisitions could easily be tracked down anywhere in the workflow, and
would make it possible to find missing samples as well as to specify which laboratories were involved
and the status of the analyses for any given requisition. From the outset, DIPS Lab was assigned the
role of the PMS because DIPS Lab was just another module in the larger EPR portfolio at the hospital.
”We want everything to be routed through DIPS, including requests to the Pathology and
Microbiology Laboratory. In this way, the staff will not need to search in many different systems for a
laboratory analysis” (Laboratory technologist, pre-unit)
Fourthly, part of the strategy was to establish a single numbering system shared by all the different
laboratory systems, enabling easy identification of requisitions across systems, among other
advantages.
“A common laboratory number should be used, or the possibility to use the numbers across the
different production systems in such a way that a sample with a given laboratory number in one
system can be directly used in another system” (Laboratory strategy document, 2007)

Figure 1.

The envisioned information flow between the GPs and the laboratories

The vendor, Well Diagnostics, was a small software company specializing in systems integration. Part
of the design strategy included not getting heavily involved in complex issues inside the organizations.
According to the CEO, one reason for this was that they knew that hospitals were very complex
organizations and thus certain clarifications with respect to the organization were preferred. Hence,
integrating Well Interactor with a designated PMS would ensure that the vendor’s developers could
relate to a well-defined interface. However, at the same time, based on many years of involvement in
the healthcare market, Well Diagnostics knew that it was very important to involve users. In line with
this, the laboratory personnel and GPs participated intensively during the design phase of Well
Interactor. On the GPs’ side, great care was taken to design a useful requisition interface and to
integrate the Well Interactor client with the GPs’ existing Electronic Patient Records. On the hospital
side, a great deal of effort was devoted to making sure that the electronic requisitions were
successfully received in the laboratory portfolio. The first laboratory to be included was Medical
Biochemistry, which had been able to receive requisitions electronically from four GP practices since

2006. In 2007, the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory received approximately 91 000 requisitions, of
which 10 000 were electronic ones (11%). The Microbiology Laboratory was included in October
2008, while the Pathology Laboratory is still not included. The Blood Bank dealt mostly with in-house
requisitions and results.

6
6.1

MOUNTING INTEGRATION CHALLENGES
Establishing sequential work tasks

To enable the new pre-analytic service unit (pre-unit) to undertake the new responsibility of receiving,
processing and distributing sample tubes, the assistants had to undergo thorough training. It was
relatively easy for the new pre-unit to undertake pre-analytic work tasks related to the Medical
Biochemistry Laboratory. The reason for this was that analyses performed at this laboratory were
fairly simple and clearly defined. The sample materials received by the laboratory were usually blood,
serum and plasma, and were primarily performed by one of the laboratory’s 30 analysis machines.
This implied that the roles and responsibilities between the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory, the preunit and the GPs were easy to clarify. Hence, it was relatively easy for the new pre-unit to undertake
the laboratory’s pre-analytic work tasks.
In comparison, it appeared to be extremely difficult to define a boundary between the work processes
in the Microbiology Laboratory and the new pre-unit. Despite a strong commitment to training, the
pre-unit’s staff did not manage to handle these requisitions, and their role amounted to unpacking and
sorting the received materials. Further handling and assessment had to be performed by highly
specialized technologists from this laboratory, who dynamically moved between particular desks at the
laboratory and the pre-unit. In contrast to Medical Biochemistry, where the requisition clearly showed
which analyses had been requested, a typical Microbiology Laboratory requisition described a
problem. For instance, a GP might ask about hepatitis, and then there were arrays of different analyses
that had to be done. In line with this, the Microbiology Laboratory had an extremely broad analysis
repertoire. Depending on the stated problem, a range of specific analyses had to be performed. After
unpacking and sorting of the sample tubes, the laboratory technologists from the Microbiology
Laboratory narrowed down an investigation strategy. This was done by a combined assessment of the
GP’s request and the additional information accompanying the requisition. This was typically clinical
information, material (articulation fluid, urine, plasma, etc.) and location on the body.
When the requisitions had passed the quality assurance, the laboratory technologists would move on to
request specific microbiological analyses in SAFIR. If the GPs had requested a bacterial analysis on a
sample from an eye, this would imply two specific analyses, involving an aerobic and an anaerobic
culture process respectively. If the GP had requested virus-based analyses, the technologist had to call
for a physician from the Microbiology Laboratory, requesting her to read the clinical information and
possibly to add additional analyses before the technologist completed the registration process. These
tasks were initially supposed to be conducted by the pre-unit staff on a rotation basis, but proved too
complicated for them to handle. As a result, the “grand vision” of a uniform and competent pre-unit
failed. As the pre-unit did not manage to establish standardized routines for microbiological samples,
the whole basis for its existence according to the initial goal faded away, and the idea was abandoned
after two years.
6.2

Failing to establish the PMS – the common portal

Although the pre-unit did not survive, a common portal in a minimal version was still a goal for the
project management, as this would contribute to providing a much-needed function for tracking the
received sample tubes and requisitions. Because DIPS Lab was already well integrated with the EPR
as well as with LabCraft, the Blood Bank system, it made sense that it should serve as the PMS:
“One cannot demand that the staff handling the received requisitions should deal with four different
systems. Therefore we thought that the received requisitions could be routed through DIPS Lab before
they was sent to SAFIR. We have already done this quite successfully with the integration between

Labcraft and DIPS Lab, meaning that requisitions received by this laboratory are first registered in
DIPS Lab before they are routed to Labcraft. The corresponding results are returned the same way
through DIPS Lab” (Laboratory technician, Blood Bank)
However, integrating SAFIR with DIPS Lab was far from straightforward. The Microbiology
Laboratory was only moderately interested in such a solution because, in any case, the essential part of
the microbiological pre-analytic work was dependent on using SAFIR, such as for assessing the
requisition and for ordering additional analyses. Hence, entering the requisitions in DIPS Lab
effectively meant doing the work “twice, and creating a real bottleneck” as one of the microbiological
laboratory technologists expressed it.
Another factor that ultimately crushed the PMS strategy was ironically enough the fact that DIPS Lab
and DIPS EPR were too well integrated: they were different modules in a common software portfolio,
and were using the same database. This implied that each external microbiological requisition as well
as results produced for the GPs would not only be visible in DIPS Lab, but also in the DIPS EPR,
where health personnel in the hospital clinics would be able to see them. According to the hospital’s
security officer and management at the Microbiology Laboratory, this would violate Norwegian law,
which imposes restrictions on sharing health information across different organizations. The chief
physician at the Microbiology Laboratory explained:
“All those who currently use DIPS Lab as their laboratory system cannot possibly avoid results of
external requisitions being visible in the EPR. You may say that it is easier to beg forgiveness for
breaking the law if you don’t have any possibility to comply with it. For us it would be more
problematic, as it would be an active choice to channel our results into DIPS Lab, and therefore we
don’t copy these results to DIPS Lab right now” (Chief Physician Microbiology Laboratory)
To deal with this situation, the security officer had suggested that the laboratory made an agreement
with all of the referring GPs in which they asked each of the patients involved if they consented to
copying of their test results to the hospital’s EPR when the results were returned to the GPs. A positive
response would then indicated by a check mark in the requisition. However, the laboratory did not
pursue such a strategy, as it would put additional burdens on the GPs.
6.3

A pre-designed work flow

Due to the failure of the pre-unit, the project management had to look for other options to support its
overall integration strategy. As the project management team saw it, receiving requisitions
electronically through Well Interactor created the opportunity to prepare the sample tubes
automatically for different laboratories, systems and analysis machines. Hence, to avoid the need to
distribute and re-label the sample tubes received in the laboratory, the new method proposed was to
make sure that the sample tubes were prepared for the analysis machines by the staff at the GP
practice. At first glance, the idea did not seem revolutionary. It was a well-proven routine for
requisitions from the wards within the hospital, which for Medical Biochemistry analysis constituted
50% of all the requisitions received at the laboratory. When physicians in the wards requested
analyses, the technologists from Medical Biochemistry collected the blood specimen from the patient.
In this process, the technologists had sample tubes that were already marked before they took the
sample from the patient. The technologists also made sure to bring a sample tube designated for the
relevant analysis machine. Accordingly, this required that the barcode glued onto the sample tube in
the GP practice included a laboratory number that could be used throughout the whole workflow.
However, the plan did not become reality. In fact, the laboratory staff strongly opposed it. As the
laboratory’s IT technologists perceived it, this would establish a dependency between the systems in
the GP practices and their laboratory infrastructure, which currently constituted over 30 analysis
machines tightly integrated with DIPS Lab.
“An analysis machine has an effective lifetime of three years (…) and when you need to replace a
machine you don’t want an external system to maintain information about each individual machine
park [at each hospital]” (Laboratory technologist, Medical Biochemistry)

Moreover, under certain circumstances the laboratory numbers currently generated in-house needed to
be supplemented with checksums and special instructions to the analysis machines. This could not be
performed as long as the barcodes were all set in the GP practices. Another issue that undermined the
idea of having labelled sample tubes ready to use in the GP practice was that the re-labelling of the
tubes in the laboratory served as a quality assurance procedure. The quality of each sample was
checked, and gluing a new barcode on the sample tube represented verification in this regard. In
addition, performing this procedure for all the sample tubes belonging to a requisition confirmed that
the necessary number of tubes had been received.
Accordingly, for the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory technologists it was extremely important to
uphold flexibility in their daily interaction with the internal infrastructure. Redistributing the barcode
generation to the GP offices would create increased interdependency between the barcode code labels
glued to the sample in the GP offices and the analysis machines in the laboratory. In this connection,
the project team forgot to take into account that it was not realistic to compare the in-house strategy
for preparing sample tubes with an external one because in an in-house context, the laboratory
exercised control of the whole work chain and could make adaptations whenever needed.
6.4

The disintegration of a unified integration strategy

As both the idea of the pre-unit and PMS had failed to materialize, the goal of implementing a
common laboratory number became even more important. A common laboratory number across the
different laboratory systems could serve as a means to achieve a better overview of the requisitions.
However, the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory and the Microbiology Laboratory had opposite
opinions about what to do. The Microbiology Laboratory was interested in exporting series of its
SAFIR laboratory numbers to the GP practice, and having the sample tubes ready marked in the GP
practice. According to the staff, this would reduce the workload in the laboratory. In contrast, the staff
in the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory argued that it was better that the infrastructure in the GP
practice (Well Interactor) generated a unique laboratory number containing a prefix that identified the
GP office. This would simplify tracking: to find out where a lost sample tube had come from, one
could just look at the laboratory number on the tube. That implied that the “samples could be traced all
the way to their origin” (Laboratory technician, Medical Biochemistry).
However, the Microbiology Laboratory insisted that the strategy of exporting SAFIR laboratory
numbers should be used. Hence, to avoid having different laboratory number generators in play, it was
decided that SAFIR should generate laboratory numbers for all the laboratories, including the Medical
Biochemistry Laboratory. Accordingly, when electronic requisitions were received at the hospital, the
Medical Biochemistry staff re-labelled the sample tubes with internal laboratory numbers as usual,
while the staff at the Microbiology Laboratory kept their sample tubes with the original label.
Unfortunately, this strategy brought its own problems. The way the laboratory numbers were
generated in SAFIR meant that within a few years the sequence would be repeated, potentially causing
duplicated laboratory numbers. This problem escalated as the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory used
the same generator as the Microbiology Laboratory. Ultimately, the Microbiology Laboratory
complained that the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory used up their laboratory numbers – as one of
the super users explained:
“The staffs at the Microbiology Laboratory complains that we [The Medical Biochemistry
Laboratory] use up their numbers on our requisitions (…) and of course, we have a much larger
production than they so it is absolutely clear that we spend their numbers to a much larger degree
than they do themselves” (Super-user, Medical Biochemistry Laboratory)
According to the chief laboratory technologist at the Microbiology Laboratory, the laboratory number
generator contained “a serious error that urgently needed to be dealt with”. Further deployment of the
system was put on hold while the laboratory in the autumn of 2009 requested the vendor ProfDoc to
add a “date” field together with the laboratory number (to ensure uniqueness) before more GP
practices were included. However, such a change was not straightforward, as the current laboratory

number was tightly embedded in the design of the system and was difficult to change. Throughout
2010, the laboratory tried to force the vendor to make the change, but the issue is still unresolved.
6.5

Blurring interfaces between the software components

When it came to actually integrating the different systems, the existing software interfaces were far
from clear-cut. DIPS Lab lacked functionality for importing free-text information from Well
Interactor. The requisitions were formatted according to the new national XML standard and DIPS
ASA had not developed a XML interpreter yet. As a temporary solution, some super users at the
Medical Biochemistry Laboratory designed an application that channelled the received requisitions
through the existing optical scanning routine, which was could read structured data such as check
boxes, but was not able to recognize free text. In practice, this meant that the clinical information and
external laboratory numbers received had to be pasted in manually into DIPS Lab. An illuminated
button in the user interface that was used to pair the sample tube and the requisition indicated the
presence of a free-text comment. The user had to press this button to copy the comment to the
clipboard in Windows. Then, the DIPS Lab window appeared on the screen and the user had to move
the mouse marker to the proper field and paste the comment into it. According to one of the super
users, the routine involved an “enormous amount of pushing the mouse to cut and paste these
comments”, but was regarded as acceptable in the pilot phase.
A key problem related to the lack of an overview originated from the Blood Bank. The laboratory
regularly received samples from maternity clinic check-ups, which were analysed at both the Blood
Bank and the Microbiology Laboratory. Coordinated follow-up was thus required. To achieve this, the
laboratory staff started to enter these requisitions into DIPS Lab when they were received in the
laboratories, assigning them a DIPS laboratory number and then performing the requisitions for the
other two laboratories from DIPS Lab:
“There are so many variants of these samples, and we have tried to achieve an overview of all the
possible ways they come to us. Then we found out if we enter the requisitions in DIPS Lab and then
make requisitions from DIPS Lab to LabCraft [Blood Bank] and to SAFIR [Microbiology] we will be
able to keep track of what happens” (Laboratory technician, Blood Bank)
One major problem in the requisition process for microbiological analysis was that the number of
possible analysis codes was huge and amounted to around 500 analysis codes for bacteriology alone.
This had been solved quite efficiently for external requisitions in Well Interactor by defining a tree
structure where, for instance, 20 different analysis codes on a lower level were collapsed into only one
code on a higher level. Uniqueness of analysis was then achieved because the GP added the type of
material. In contrast, this was not possible for internal requisitions conducted through DIPS EPR in the
hospital clinics. Here, the ordering physician did not know exactly what kind of analysis code to use;
in practice, it was nearly impossible or at least very difficult to have an overview of the codes. As a
result, some of the experienced laboratory technicians in the laboratory designed 15 dummy analysis
codes representing a group of DIPS analysis codes, which were added to DIPS Lab. When using the
dummy codes; the ordering physician was then strongly encouraged to add clinical information and
the type of material to the requisition. Based on the combination of the dummy code and the clinical
information, the laboratory technicians at the Microbiology Laboratory were able to add the correct
analysis codes for the internal requisitions received in the laboratory.
While it was possible to send external results from the Pathology Laboratory to the GPs, the internal
results were another matter. Previously, some effort had been committed to sending results internally,
i.e. to DIPS Lab, but there had been some technical problems. Results consisting of more than 4000
characters could cause some part of the text to get lost, which could happen both within and at the end
of the result. After a while, some new integration tools were tried, which also failed. Because of the
different systems involved, it was difficult to identify exactly where the problem was. Eventually, the
Pathology Laboratory chose to continue sending pathology results on paper, whereupon the secretaries
in each hospital clinic scanned the paper-based results into DIPS Lab, thus making them available for
the physicians.

7
7.1

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The process of escalation: Unfolding complexity

Considered in isolation, one at a time, each of the reasons for delays, additional costs and redefined
goals in this project described in our case narrative (the common pre-unit, the PMS and the common
laboratory number generator) seem in hindsight to be solvable, arguably almost trivial, problems.
How, then, is it that they create the level of problems for the implementation?
A key point with our case has been to describe how apparently rational and well-founded ideas failed
to materialize and instead become part of an escalating process that was partly out of control. Initially,
the project was well planned and based on well-founded project management principles. These
included involving the users and other stakeholders in the process. However, during the process
several unforeseen circumstances emerged, inducing the project management to deal with them and
find alternative strategies shaped by a reduced number of options. As in other escalating large-scale
projects (see, for instance, Drummond, 1996) we do not think we can tease out a single cause to
explain why the envisioned workflow did not materialize, but note that there may be several
interlinked causes interacting with each other, which may explain why the escalation happened.
This is essentially an argument about complexity resulting from the unforeseen number, type and
scope of interdependencies between modules, systems and work routines (Hanseth and Ciborra, 2007;
Boudreau and Robey, 2005; Volkoff et al., 2007). These interdependencies, e.g. how the common use
of SAFIR’s laboratory number generator might cause the system to run out of available numbers due
to extending its use to the analysis-intensive Medical Biochemistry Laboratory, are easy to recognize
in retrospect, but materialized only during the implementation of the project. It is only with the benefit
of hindsight that the problems become “obvious”; during implementation, the implications of the
interdependencies exceeded what could be reasonably expected from careful planning and project
management.
In addition, integrated systems may represent dependencies per se and are thus a source of complexity.
Here you may consider how reiterating efforts of integrating results from the pathology system
Sympathy into the EPR failed each time and where it was not possible to identify the problem exactly.
Furthermore, Boudreau and Robey (2005, p. 5) make the general argument that when “technological
artifacts become more tightly integrated into larger systems or networks, a narrower range of
enactment may be expected from users”. We also found it fruitful to recall Perrow’s (1984) notion of
loose and tight coupling to describe the degree of dependencies between the various components in a
larger system portfolio. He warns that tightly coupled systems have very little slack, with only limited
ways to accomplish a task. A striking illustration of this is how the project management group
envisioned a predesigned workflow with ready-marked sample tubes between the GPs and specific
analysis machines in the Medical Biochemistry Laboratory. This initiative failed due to the increased
dependencies that such a design would cause. Similarly, the pre-unit, the PMS and the common
laboratory number represented tightly connected initiatives, where the failure of one of them would
limit possible options for the others. Compared to the envisioned seamless workflow, the actual results
were discouraging: the new design failed to materialize. This also had quite serious consequences for
the vendor Well Diagnostics, which initially wanted to clarify its responsibility vis-à-vis the hospital
through a well-defined interface. Ultimately, the vendor had to integrate Well Interactor directly with
both DIPS Lab and SAFIR, and will later do this for the Pathology Laboratory as well.
7.2

Integrated information systems revisited

Bracketing the process of escalating complexities of implementing integrated systems, what is the
resulting image of integration that emerges? Clearly, we want to move beyond the many snapshotbased assessment studies conducted in the IS research field, which essentially focus quite narrowly on
the gap between the system’s functionality and its usefulness in a given practice. For example, Pollock
and Williams (2008) emphasize the need to invest time in the organization to uncover the long-term
effects of an implementation. While the “grand” vision failed to materialize in this case, a parallel and

more modest process emerged in the laboratories, which has resulted in some interesting results. Here,
the actual result of the integration effort is neither a complete failure nor a complete success. The
outcome is rather more nuanced, and, in our opinion, better reflects the dynamics of IS implementation
projects where substantial time and context are taken into account.
We supplement this longitudinal perspective (i.e. adding a time dimension) by paying attention to the
different contexts involved (i.e. a special dimension), viz. the various laboratories. In table 1, we
summarize the long-term effects of the integration efforts, where it was achieved and a rough outline
of its nature.

Med. Biochemistry

Blood Bank

Microbiology

Pathology

Reading test results
(external and internal)
Producing requisitions
(external and internal)
Obtaining an overview
and status of the text

Table 2.

The different degrees of integration in the laboratory portfolio are indicated by
different shadings - the darker the shading, the larger the degree of workarounds
needed to sustain the integration

Based on the table, we may easily interpret the horizontal axis (the different laboratories) as each
laboratory’s volume of transactions (i.e. requisitions and results) where the Medical Biochemistry
Laboratory was engaged in the highest interaction and the Pathology laboratory the lowest. A similar
interpretation of the vertical axis indicates the importance of the service for the ordering physician
from high to low.
The Medical Biochemistry Laboratory (with least shading) is fairly well integrated, while the other
laboratories are integrated to a greater or lesser extent. To explain the (middle) shaded area: in the
Blood Bank, having an overview of external maternity check-up samples was extremely important,
which was achieved by establishing a manual routine. This involved first entering data into DIPS lab,
then requesting analysis at the Blood Bank and the Microbiology Laboratory respectively. Similarly,
internal requisitions for the Microbiology Laboratory needed to be sustained with dummy analysis
codes. Finally, results for pathology were integrated using a manual routine where the secretaries
scanned the pathology results into the EPR, thus making the results available to the physicians.
Given the outline of integration as presented in table 2, it is quite interesting that the laboratory IS
portfolio appears much less fragmented than the project results may suggest. Hence taking into
account the variables volume of transaction and importance of service provides a more homogeneous
picture of the current state of affairs. According to this concept, the combination (few
transactions/many workarounds and many transactions/fewer workarounds) is quite acceptable for
sustaining the integration in general terms.
This suggests that a strategy that makes some economic sense in integration projects is to commit the
main effort where it may have the best effect: in the top-left corner, gradually extending downwards
and to the right. We suggest that the content of the table may serve as a conceptual framework for
large-scale integration projects, as the “grey” or “black” gaps indicate where to prioritize future
integration initiatives. One may then choose to focus on the gaps for the most important services and
the highest volume of transactions. The framework also allows tailoring to the specific need at hand.
For instance, one might add new organizational units (horizontally) or services (vertically), or possibly
zoom in on the existing services to achieve greater granularity.
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